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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
DENNY DUKE KANDT, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.980230-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction of aggravated assault, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (Supp. 1998), and a group criminal 
activity enhancement pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (1995) (copies of these 
statutes are attached in Add. A). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(e)(1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW1 
1. Did defendant's trial counsel render ineffective assistance below when he: 
a. failed to object to admission of any of the gang-related evidence; 
b. failed to object to testimony about the possibility of future gang violence or 
retaliation; and 
c. failed to call more than one alibi witness and defendant himself to testify? 
Because the trial court ruled on this claim in the context of defendant's post-trial 
motion for a new trial, this claim presents a mixed question of law and fact on appeal. 
State v. Classon. 935 P.2d 524, 531 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 945 P.2d 1118 (Utah 
1997). This Court must defer to the trial court's findings of fact, but reviews its legal 
conclusions nondeferentially for correctness. Id.; State v. Perry. 899 P.2d 1232, 1238-39 
(Utah App. 1995). reh'g denied (Aug. 14, 1995). 
2. Did the trial court properly admit evidence of both the victim's and the 
defendant's gang membership and the relationship of that information to the charged 
assault, pursuant to the parties' agreement? 
The decision to admit or exclude evidence under rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, 
is reviewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion. State v. Finlavson. 956 P.2d 283,291 
(Utah App.), cert, granted. (Oct. 10, 1998); State v. Alonzo. 932 P.2d 606, 613 (Utah 
App. 1997), affd, 359 Utah Adv. Rep. 32 (Utah Dec. 29,1998); State v. Jacques. 924 
!The State has reorganized defendant's points on appeal because the disposition of 
the claims lends itself more readily to the modified organization. 
2 
P.2d 898, 900 (Utah App. 1996).2 However, as defense counsel's agreement invited any 
error in admission of the evidence, defendant is not entitled to appellate review of his 
claim. State v. Stevenson. 884 P.2d 1287, 1292 (Utah App. 1994), cert, denied, 892 P.2d 
13 (Utah 1995). 
3. Was the evidence sufficient to establish defendant's guilt of aggravated assault? 
On appeal, this issue is reviewed with great deference to the jury verdict. State v. 
Jiron. 882 P.2d 685, 691 (Utah App. 1994), cert, denied, 892 P.2d 13 (Utah 1995). The 
evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom are viewed in the light most favorable to 
the jury's verdict. State v. Olsen. 869 P.2d 1004, 1012 (Utah App. 1994). "'Where there 
is any evidence, including reasonable inferences that can be drawn from it, from which 
findings of all the elements of the crime can be made beyond a reasonable doubt, our 
inquiry is complete and we will sustain the verdict.'" Jiron. 882 P.2d at 691 (quoting State 
v. Goddard. 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994)) (additional quotation omitted); see also State 
v. Hall. 946 P.2d 712, 724 (Utah App. 1997), cert, denied. 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1998). 
Reversal is not warranted unless the evidence is "so inconclusive or inherently 
2Defendant does not recognize this well-established standard of review, but cites to 
a less-deferential standard applied to the admission or exclusion of gruesome photographs 
under rule 403. Br. of Aplt. at 2,11. Aside from the fact that this jurisdiction has never 
recognized gang-related evidence to be one of the "certain categories of relevant 
evidence" to which the less deferential test is applied (see State v. Dibello. 780 P.2d 1221, 
1229 (Utah 1989); State v. Laffertv. 749 P.2d 1239, 1256 (Utah 1988)), this Court need 
not consider whether gang-related evidence warrants a different standard of review 
because the evidence was admitted below pursuant to the parties' agreement, and 
defendant fails to acknowledge the existence or challenge the validity of the agreement. 
3 
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime." Jiron. 882 P.2d at 691. 
Moreover, a claim of insufficient evidence will not be reviewed unless the 
appellant marshals the evidence supporting the jury's verdict and demonstrates how the 
evidence, and the reasonable inferences therefrom, is insufficient to support the verdict. 
State v. Strain. 885 P.2d 810, 819 (Utah App. 1994); State v. Pilling. 875 P.2d 604, 607-
08 (Utah App. 1994). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule provisions pertinent to the 
resolution of the issue presented on appeal is contained in or appended to this brief, 
including: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1995); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (1995); and 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (Supp. 1998). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with aggravated assault, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (Supp. 1998), and faced a group 
criminal activity enhancement pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (1995), based on 
the allegation that he committed the assault with two or more persons (R. 6-10). The day 
of trial, the prosecutor amended the information to reflect a third degree felony (R. 63-
64). Following a two-day trial, a jury convicted defendant as charged (R. 125). 
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Defendant then sought to have the group criminal activity enhancement charge stricken 
(R. 130-31), and obtained private counsel (R. 143-45). Defendant's new counsel, who 
also represents defendant on appeal, filed a motion for a new trial, claiming: unfair 
prejudice from introduction of gang-related evidence, insufficiency of the evidence to 
support the verdict, and ineffective assistance of counsel for, among other things, failure 
to object to gang-related evidence, failure to call additional alibi witnesses, and failure to 
permit defendant to testify (R. 149-54). After briefing and argument, the district court 
denied the new trial motion (R. 235-39) as well as the motion to strike the enhancement 
(R. 186-88), then court imposed a sentence of no more than five years in prison for the 
aggravated assault with a three-year consecutive term for the enhancement (R. 159). 
Defendant timely appealed, presenting to this Court the same express arguments 
noted above which were included below in his motion for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS3 
Dino Hernandez had been a gang member for a number of years (R. 249: 7-8).4 
Initially, he associated with Diamond Street gang, but after about a year, he turned to the 
Salt Lake Posse, with which he was associated on July 28, 1997 (]d.). 
3The facts are recited in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict. State v. 
Brvant. 965 P.2d 539, 541 (Utah App. 1998); State v. Pavne. 964 P.2d 327, 329 (Utah 
App. 1998). 
4Because each of the transcripts in this case have been given a single record 
number, citation herein to these documents will be to the number stamped on the cover of 
each transcript volume, followed by a colon and the internal page number (i.e., R. 249: 7). 
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On that day, Dino was driving on the west side of Salt Lake City at 5:30 p.m. when 
he received a page (R. 249: 11,28). He noticed a nearby phone booth at a Pizza Hut near 
700 North and Redwood Road and pulled into the parking lot (R. 249: 12). Because he 
was a gang member and all gang members are "potential targets", he drove around the 
restaurant a couple of times to see if he saw anyone from a rival gang (R. 249: 13-14, 
109). Seeing no one, he decided to stop and answer the page (id.). A few cars were 
parked facing the curb in front of the phone booth, which was attached to the outside of 
the building, so Dino parked behind them, parallel to the building, left his door open, and 
went to use the phone (R. 249: 12-14, 52). 
He picked up the handset but had not completed the call when he saw three 
members of a rival gang approach him (R. 249: 14-15). They approached him so quickly 
that he was able to see only the one in front of the group before the beating began and 
recognized him as a member of the Diamond Street gang (R. 249: 14-15, 18). Dino was 
beaten into a near-fetal position, keeping himself upright on one knee but doubled over 
and protecting his face as he was hit and kicked by the trio (R. 249: 15-16). He felt 
several crushing blows to the back of his head from a hard, heavy object he thought might 
be a rock (R. 249: 17). Amid the yelling and the chaos of the thirty-to-sixty second 
beating, Dino heard defendant's voice (R. 249: 17-18,29-30). Having known defendant 
over several years and having had several prior confrontations with him, Dino was 
confident that it was defendant's voice that he heard (R. 249: 6-7, 18-19). 
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When the beating ceased, Dino managed to drag himself into the Pizza Hut, where 
the employees called 911 and tried to stop the bleeding from the open wound on the back 
of his head (R. 249: 19-20, 54). Upon hearing about the phone call, Dino left and drove 
to a nearby friend's house (R. 249: 20). However, within ten minutes of arriving, he had 
someone drive him to the hospital because of the searing pain in his head (R. 249: 20). 
The wounds on Dino's head took 40 stitches to close, and his injuries forced him to quit 
his job and to stop driving (R. 249: 20-22, 27). 
Dino quickly discovered that he had lost his pager during the assault (R. 249: 19). 
He began receiving calls at his house, as did several friends of his who had previously 
paged him, from one of the males who had assaulted him (R. 249: 19, 23). The caller 
bragged about who it was and what had happened (id.). Dino became concerned that his 
house might be targeted by the rival gang, and worry for his three young children 
prompted him to contact the local gang unit to ask the police to watch his house when 
they were patrolling (R. 249: 23). A couple of days later, two officers stopped by and 
Dino told them the details of the assault (R. 249: 24-25). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Point I; Defendant fails to establish any of his three claims of ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel. His claim that counsel failed to object to evidence of future 
gang violence is inadequately briefed, permitting this Court to decline to reach the claim 
as it violates the appellate briefing rule. 
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Defense counsel made a well-reasoned decision to agree to admission of gang-
related evidence to enable him to attack the victim's veracity by show-casing the victim's 
motive to lie and falsely implicate defendant, while still asserting defendant's alibi 
defense. Such reasonable trial strategy does not amount to ineffective assistance of 
counsel. 
Defense counsel's use of a single witness to present the alibi defense was also a 
matter of legitimate trial strategy. Counsel had at least two other witnesses present at 
trial, indicating that he would be calling at least one of them. However, after presenting a 
single alibi witness, counsel decided not to call any others. The record shows that 
counsel was afraid that additional testimony might contradict and dilute the testimony 
already given, and the affidavits of the proposed witnesses contain sufficient 
inconsistencies to support this concern. Counsel may also have been concerned about the 
fact that all proposed witnesses, including defendant himself, would be subject to cross-
examination. The State noted some of the evidence it was prepared to present on cross 
had the witnesses been called, and defense counsel may have felt the additional risk to the 
defense was not worth the additional testimony. On this record, counsel's decision not to 
adduce further alibi testimony appears to be well-reasoned trial strategy and does not 
amount to ineffective assistance. 
Point II: Defendant's claim of error in the admission of gang-related evidence at 
trial fails because his counsel agreed to the admission in order to further his trial strategy 
8 
of using the victim's gang membership and history of gang involvement to challenge the 
victim's veracity and motives. That strategy was reasonable under the facts of this case 
(see Point I). Consequently, the invited error doctrine precludes appellate review of this 
claim. 
Point III: There was ample evidence adduced at trial to support the jury's 
determination that defendant was guilty at least as an aider or abettor, if not as a principal, 
in the assault on the victim. The evidence concerning the fact that the victim and 
defendant had known each other for years and had clashed in the past, independent of any 
mention of gang activity, supported the victim's positive identification of defendant's 
voice during the assault and suggested a possible motive for his participation. 
Defendant's possession and use of the victim's pager, lost at the scene of the assault, to 
contact various friends of the victim to brag about his identity and the assault supports 
findings that defendant was present at the assault and harbored the requisite intent. Other 
evidence which suggested that defendant drove the trio to the scene, made no attempt to 
prevent the assault, then immediately left with the group provides added support for the 
jury's determination. Consequently, there was sufficient evidence upon which the jury 
could find that defendant intentionally aided and encouraged, if not actively participated 
in, the assault, justifying a guilty verdict. 
9 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT FAILS TO ADEQUATELY BRIEF ONE CLAIM OF 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL, AND THE RECORD 
REFLECTS THAT THE REMAINING TWO CLAIMS OF COUNSEL'S 
FAILURE TO ACT WERE A MATTER OF TRIAL STRATEGY 
In Point III of his brief, defendant attacks his trial counsel's effectiveness on three 
grounds. First, he argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing object to admission 
of all gang-related information at trial. Br. of Aplt. at 22. Second, defendant faults his 
counsel's failure to object to any testimony related to the victim's fear of possible future 
gang violence or retaliation. Id at 22-23. Third, defendant claims his trial counsel failed 
to adequately present his defense because he did not call additional witnesses or 
defendant himself to corroborate the testimony of one defense witness that defendant was 
with her at the time of the assault. Id. at 23. However, defendant fails to carry his burden 
of establishing any of these claims on appeal. 
A. Standard of Review 
To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance, appellant must show that trial 
counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the 
trial's outcome. State v. Winward, 941 P.2d 627, 635 (Utah App. 1997) (citing Strickland 
v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 687-88,693,104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064,2067 (1984)); State v. 
Perrv. 899 P.2d 1232, 1239 (Utah App. 1995). To show deficient performance, defendant 
must prove that counsel's representation "fell below an objective standard of 
10 
reasonableness." State v. Classon, 935 P.2d 524, 531 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 945 P.2d 
1118 (Utah 1997); see also State v. Finlavson. 956 P.2d 283, 293 (Utah App. 1998), cert 
granted. (Oct. 10, 1998). This requires that defendant identify the specific acts or 
omissions that "'fall outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.'" 
Classon. 935 P.2d at 532 (quoting State v. Frame. 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986)). 
Defendant's claim may not be purely speculative, but must be a demonstrative reality. 
State v. Severance. 828 P.2d 1066, 1070 (Utah App. 1992). Because of the extremely 
broad deference afforded to trial counsel's choices concerning trial strategy (id; Perry. 
899 P.2d at 1239), appellant must demonstrate "'that counsel's actions were not 
conscious trial strategy,'" Winward. 941 P.2d at 635 (quoting State v. Garrett. 849 P.2d 
578, 579 (Utah App. 1993) (additional quotations omitted)), and "'that there was a 'lack 
of any conceivable tactical basis' for counsel's actions.'" Id. (quoting State v. Moritzskv. 
771 P.2d 688, 692 (Utah App. 1989)). 
To establish the requisite prejudice, defendant must show that the alleged errors 
were so serious as to deprive defendant of a fair trial. Classon. 935 P.2d at 532. This 
requires a showing that a "reasonable probability" exists that the trial would have had a 
different result absent counsel's errors. Finlavson. 956 P.2d at 293; Classon. 935 P.2d at 
532. A "reasonable probability" is a probability that is "'sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the reliability of the outcome.'" Classon. 935 P.2d at 532 (quoting 
Strickland. 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068); see also Finlavson. 956 P.2d at 294. 
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Bi Defense Counsel's Failure To Object To Admission Of Gang-Related 
Evidence Was A Matter Of Legitimate Trial Strategy 
A review of the record defeats defendant's first claim-that his trial counsel failed 
to object to admission of all gang-related evidence. At the hearing on defendant's motion 
for a new trial, the parties addressed defendant's ineffective assistance claims. The 
prosecutor reminded the trial judge that the parties had discussed the matter of gang-
related evidence with her in her chambers prior to trial (R. 255: 28-29) (a copy of the 
exchange is attached in Add. B). The parties informed the judge that they had agreed 
that both sides would be inquiring at trial into the matter of gang membership (R. 255: 
29). Add. B. Defendant's trial counsel intended to highlight the victim's gang 
affiliations and his grudge against defendant in order to attack the victim's credibility and 
establish a motive for the victim to falsely accuse defendant of this crime (id.). Add. B. 
The prosecutor felt that if gang membership were to be made an issue, then the State 
should be permitted to adduce evidence of defendant's membership in Diamond Street 
gang (id,'). Add. B. 
The parties informed the trial court in the pre-trial conference of their agreement 
on the gang evidence issue and, based on that agreement, the parties and the court 
extensively discussed gang-related questions with the jury venire (R. 250:45-46,65-66, 
71-75,91,96-104,109-10,116-19,134-37,144,164-65), the prosecutor made references 
to gang-related matters in his opening statement to diffuse the possible impact of the 
12 
information when defendant discussed it (R. 250: 167-68, 171-72; 255: 30), and both 
sides adduced gang-related evidence at trial without objection (R. 249: 7-10,40-43,44-
45, 83-89). Add. B. 
In rejecting defendant's claim of ineffective assistance on this issue, the trial court 
stated: 
While in hindsight the things that former counsel did might have appeared 
to have been mistaken strategy, I think it very clearly was part of his trial strategy; 
in other words, that the victim was a gang member who was assaulted by rival 
gang members but we weren't there. 
And in fact, that was said in conversation between counsel and I. I don't 
recall at what stage of the proceedings it was, it may have been when we were 
discussing witnesses or it may have been during voir dire process or at some other 
point, but that was raised because counsel both made it clear to me that part of the 
defendant's trial strategy was to allow that [gang] evidence in because their 
defense was he wasn't there, so it didn't really matter. 
It also appears to me that had that not been part of the trial strategy, much 
of that clearly went to motive, to explain an otherwise unexplainable assault. 
(R. 255: 46-47) (a copy of the ruling is attached in Add. B).5 
Defense counsel's agreement to the arrangement was consistent with a reasonable 
trial strategy. State v. Hall. 946 P.2d 712, 717 (Utah App. 1997), cert, denied. 953 P.2d 
449 (Utah 1998). He was able to use the information to his best advantage as part of a 
5The actual pre-trial discussion on gang evidence does not appear in the record, 
there was no evidentiary hearing below involving defendant's claims of ineffective 
assistance, and defendant has sought no remand pursuant to rule 23B, Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. However, the memories of both the prosecutor and the trial court as 
stated during the motion hearing below are not disputed by defendant. 
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well-reasoned tactic designed to attack the victim's veracity by show-casing his motive to 
lie and to implicate defendant falsely, while still asserting defendant's alibi defense. See 
People v. Cox, 809 P.2d 351, 372 (Cal. 1991) ("[Evidence of gangs [is] a twin sword 
which could be utilized by the defense in attacking the credibility of the victim."), cert. 
denied, 502 U.S. 1062(1992). 
Defense counsel's strategy was apparent in his opening statement: 
Well, now, wait a minute, you say, how can that be? Already we have a 
conflict. The victim's going to be saying that Denny did it to him. Denny's 
friends will be saying, No, he was with us all the time. Somebody is telling a lie 
here and that's what you'll be asked to listen to today as you listen to every single 
witness who gets on that witness stand, look at them, use all of your experience of 
human nature concerning truth or lie, as each witness is on that stand and ask, 
Who's telling the truth here? Who's telling a lie? 
What motivation would anyone have to tell the truth here or a lie? Well, the 
evidence will show that Dino [the victim] testified under oath at a prior hearing 
and at the prior hearing, he admitted to being a gang member, he admitted prior 
confrontations with Denny, in which a friend of the victim, a friend of Dino's, 
threw a rock through-at Denny's house. 
Dino, the victim, will testify that he held a grudge against Denny. Consider 
that and consider-ask motivation when Dino gets on the stand." 
(R. 250: 176-77) (counsel's opening statement is attached in Add. C). 
As the trial developed, defense counsel acted on that strategy. At trial, the victim 
admitted being a member of a gang called the Salt Lake Posse and testified to his history 
of gang involvement (R. 249: 7-10). Aside from the affiliation of both defendant and the 
victim with rival gangs, the gang-related evidence dealt primarily with the victim. 
Defendant's trial counsel questioned the victim at length about a prior gang-related 
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confrontation between the victim and defendant in which defendant was the victim (R. 
249:40-43). Defense counsel established that the victim had a gang-related "grudge" 
against defendant and against defendant's gang (R. 249: 43), and implied throughout the 
trial that the victim had falsely identified defendant to effectuate that "grudge" (R. 249: 
41-43, 107-08; 250: 176-77,231). This theme was joined with trial counsel's attack on 
the victim's "voice only" identification of defendant and defendant's use of an alibi 
witness to establish that he was not at the scene of the assault (R. 249: 28-30, 93-124; 
250: 230-31). Finally, in closing, defense counsel suggested that Dino "may be 
retaliating" or using this as "a way to get back at Denny" because of the admitted grudge 
(R. 250: 231). 
While defendant's appellate counsel might not agree with former counsel's 
conscious trial strategy-in fact, he fails to even acknowledge it-nothing in the record 
establishes that it was unreasonable or fell below "an objective standard of 
reasonableness". 
C. Review Of Defense Counsel's Failure To Object To Evidence Of Future Gang 
Violence Is Not Warranted Because Of Inadequate Briefing 
Defendant separately attacks his trial counsel's failure to object to evidence 
implying the possibility of future gang violence. Br. of Aplt. at 22-23. However, the 
argument fails to comply with this Court's briefing rule. 
Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requires that defendant's brief 
include an argument which "shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant 
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with respect to the issues presented . . with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts 
of the record relied on." Defendant's argument consists of three sentences and no citation 
to legal authority. Br. of Aplt. at 22-23. Defendant summarily claims that trial counsel 
should have moved to strike testimony and sought admonishment of the jury because the 
evidence of future gang violence was "inflammatory" and not reasonably justifiable. Id. 
However, defendant does not establish a legal basis for such a motion or otherwise justify 
his position. Because the argument fails to meet the briefing requirements of rule 24(a), 
this Court should not address the issue. See State v. Haga. 954 P.2d 1284, 1287 n.3 (Utah 
App. 1998); see also State v. Thomas. 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998) (finding that a 
claim consisting of citation to constitutional provisions and a single case without any 
analysis of what the authority requires and how the facts of the case apply to the cited 
authority constitutes inadequate briefing).6 
6The evidence consisted of testimony that: 1) the victim delayed reporting the 
incident out of a fear of possible retaliation by Diamond Street involving his house and 
his three children; and 2) the victim did not testify voluntarily because he was afraid of 
being labeled a "snitch" and being targeted by gang members (R. 249: 23-27). Fear of 
retaliation is relevant and admissible as it goes to the issue of credibility. United States 
v. Abel. 469 U.S. 45, 49, 105 S. Ct. 465, 467 (1984); United States v. Kevs. 899 F.2d 
983, 987 (10th Cir.), cert, denied. 498 U.S. 858 (1990); seg also United States v. Santiago. 
46 F.3d 885, 890 (9th Cir.), cert, denied. 515 U.S. 1162 (1995). In this case, the testimony 
was the victim's own explanation of his reporting delay, of his ultimate reason for calling 
the police, of his earlier hesitancy to speak to police either at Pizza Hut or at the hospital, 
of his reluctance to testify, and of his hesitation on the stand in identifying his assailants 
(R. 249: 18, 20, 23-26,46). Moreover, by explaining why he did what he did and the 
timing of his actions, it also properly completed the story from the victim's point of view. 
See State v. Wright. 893 P.2d 1113,1116-17 (Utah App. 1995) (finding it reasonable for 
the jury to believe the victim's testimony that she delayed reporting out of a fear that 
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jQ. The Absence of Additional Witnesses To Corroborate Defendant's Alibi Was 
A Matter Of Legitimate Trial Strategy 
Defense counsel called Michelle Garcia as his sole witness to present an alibi: that 
defendant was with Garcia and several other people during the afternoon, evening and 
night of July 29, 1997, first at the courthouse, then at Garcia's house (R. 249: 93-101). 
Defendant now faults his trial counsel for failing to develop the alibi defense through use 
of additional witnesses, including himself. Br. of Aplt. at 23-24. In support, he points to 
affidavits of Amanda Garay, Rosie Amaro, and himself, filed in support of the new trial 
motion below, which noted the willingness of these individuals to testify at trial and the 
general content of their proposed testimony (R. 177-85). IdL at 23. However, defendant 
fails to establish that his counsel's decision not to call additional witnesses was anything 
but a legitimate trial strategy. State v. Tennvson. 850 P.2d 461,468 (Utah App. 1993) (so 
long as this Court may articulate some plausible strategic explanation for counsel's 
behavior, counsel will be assumed to have acted competently). 
That defense counsel considered calling additional witnesses is clear from the 
record. At the hearing on defendant's motion for a new trial, the prosecutor noted that 
defense counsel had told him that Rosie Amaro "just failed to show up for court11, which 
is why defense counsel did not call her to testify (R. 255: 35). Add. B. Amanda Garay 
defendant might retaliate against her or her children). Finally, the evidence countered 
defendant's claim that the victim had a motive to lie about defendant's involvement. As 
the prosecutor pointed out, if the victim had falsely or maliciously targeted defendant, he 
would have wanted to actively pursue charges (R. 250: 237-38). 
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was present at trial and defense counsel identified her in his opening statement as one of 
defendant's potential witnesses (R. 249: 175-76; 255: 35). Add. B. Counsel thereafter 
chose not to call her, and later told the prosecutor that it was because "he was concerned 
that she would contradict Michelle Garcia's testimony and by contradicting her 
testimony, would dilute the value of Ms. Garcia's testimony." (R. 255: 35). Add. B. 
Finally, defense counsel and defendant discussed the possibility of calling more witnesses 
in an unrecorded conversation at the close of defendant's case (R. 249: 124-25). Defense 
counsel then represented to the court that the defense would call no additional witnesses 
and rested his case, offering no basis for his considered decision (id.). Defendant offered 
no comment or objection and did nothing to suggest that he was acting solely on 
counsel's recommendation but did not agree with his counsel's statement (id.). 
In ruling on defendant's new trial motion, the trial court explained: 
I do recall during the course of the trial that [defense counsel] indicated there was 
a second witness [in addition to Ms. Garcia, who testified] that he would be calling 
and that once Ms. Garcia testified, he changed his mind. 
Now, I'm not part of his thinking process on that. I can only assume he 
made that determination after listening to her [Ms. Garcia's] testimony and 
knowing what he knew about the status of the evidence at that point. He didn't fail 
to have other witnesses available, in fact, they were here and he made a 
determination, after hearing Ms. Garcia testify, that he would not call the others. 
I don't think any of that rises to the level of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. I think he had a pre-conceived idea of how he wanted this case to go and 
as I started out by saying, in hindsight, we may disagree with that. It was his 
strategy and he had every opportunity to pursue that for [defendant's] benefit. 
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(R. 255: 47). Add. B. Defendant points to no record evidence which contradicts the 
memories of the prosecutor and the trial court that defense counsel had other witnesses 
prepared to testify as to defendant's alibi. 
Further, counsel's strategic decision not to call more witnesses is supported by the 
discrepancies apparent on the face of those potential witnesses' affidavits. Comparison of 
the affidavits reveals differences in the proposed testimony of all the defense witnesses 
which the jury might have felt undermined the credibility of the alibi defense (copies of 
the affidavits are attached in Add. D). Specifically: 
-Garcia names at least three people who were together at the courthouse after the 
Molina hearing who Garay does not mention (R. 177-78; 249: 96); Amaro 
specifically says that one of those three was not present (R. 184); 
-Garcia testified that five people left the courthouse in Amber Lloyd's car (R. 249: 
97); Garay claims that five people left the courthouse in Garay's car (R. 178); 
-Garcia testified twice that they left the courthouse at 5:30 or 5:45 p.m. (R. 249: 
97-98, 117-18); Amaro claims that they left at 6:00 p.m. (R. 184); 
-Amaro does not identify Garcia as being with the group at the courthouse after 
the Molina hearing or with the group that left with defendant (R. 183-84). 
These differences weaken the alibi defense by bringing into question the accuracy 
of the alibi witnesses' memories, with Amaro's affidavit seriously undermining Garcia's 
credibility by making no mention of her presence. These differences likely weighed 
heavily in defense counsel's decision not to call further alibi witnesses in an attempt to 
present the strongest alibi available. 
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Finally, as the prosecutor pointed out during the new trial hearing, the witnesses 
would have been open to cross-examination had they taken the stand (R. 255: 40). The 
questioning would have included inquiries into each witness' relationship with defendant 
and the Diamond Street gang to undermine their veracity and expose their biases (id.).7 
The record suggests that counsel's decision not to call to the stand Anthony 
Wallace-the attacker defendant saw-was also a matter of trial strategy. During trial, 
defense counsel consulted with defendant before representing on the record that 
defendant has decided not to call Anthony Wallace to the stand, indicating that counsel 
was aware of the option and consciously chose not to exercise it (R. 249: 79). At the 
hearing on defendant's motion for a new trial, the prosecutor explained that had Wallace 
been called to testify, the prosecutor was prepared to question Wallace and/or call 
Detective Rich Montenez to the stand (R. 255: 35-36). Detective Montenez could testify 
that Anthony Wallace told him that defendant had asked Wallace to lie about defendant 
not being at the scene of the assault, and that Wallace was not anxious to perjure himself 
when he testified (R. 255: 36). It is reasonable to believe under these facts that defense 
counsel consciously chose to avoid the risks involved in having Wallace take the stand. 
As for defendant's failure to testify, defendant has not demonstrated that his 
counsel's decision fell below an objective standard of reasonableness or was anything 
7The prosecutor revealed to the trial court that he believed Garay was defendant's 
girlfriend and that some of the witnesses had long associations with Diamond Street, 
although he did not expound upon what proof he might have elicited (R. 255: 37, 40). 
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other than trial strategy. Defendant's brief claims only that he "was willing to testify at 
trialf,]" not that he was prevented from doing so (Br. of Aplt at 23), and nothing in the 
record suggests that he would have testified absent contrary advice from his counsel. 
Defendant's affidavit additionally claims that his trial counsel did not "fairly 
discuss[]" the reasons behind his advice that defendant not testify (R. 180). Add. D. 
However, defense counsel consulted with defendant during trial immediately prior to 
announcing that defendant would not be taking the stand (R. 255: 36). Defendant gave no 
indication any time prior to the filing of the post-trial motion that he did not fully 
understand or concur with his counsel's decision. This is insufficient to establish that 
trial counsel performed deficiently. See State v. Newman. 928 P.2d 1040, 1045 (Utah 
App. 1996) (the mere fact that defendant did not testify does not establish ineffective 
assistance of counsel). 
While the decision could have been made for any number of legitimate tactical 
reasons, one of the more obvious ones would have been to avoid a potentially harmful 
cross-examination of defendant. The record shows defendant to be a long-time gang 
member with a history of confrontations with this victim (R. 155-56 [psi]; 249: 8, 15, 83-
87). Had he expressly denied his gang membership-as he has done in his pleadings-the 
State was prepared to attack that testimony (R. 151, 155-56; 255: 37). On this record, it 
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appears that defense counsel weighed the risks and made a reasoned determination that 
the risks of having defendant testify outweighed the possible benefits.8 
Ex The Cumulative Error Doctrine Does Not Apply 
Defendant's argument includes an assertion that the cumulative effect of his trial 
counsel's deficient performance requires a new triaL Br. of Aplt. at 23-24. However, 
because defendant has failed to establish any errors of counsel that prejudiced his right to 
a fair trial, the cumulative error doctrine does not apply. Parsons v. Barnes. 871 P.2d 516, 
516 (Utah) (reRising to apply the cumulative error analysis where defendant failed to 
establish any of his eight claims of ineffective assistance) (citing Bundv v. DeLand, 763 
8Defendant also fails to establish prejudice from his failure to testify. Defendant's 
argument requires this Court to assess the probable impact of his likely testimony. See 
State v. Arguelles. 921 P.2d 439,441 (Utah 1996). His affidavit claims that he would 
have testified Mas to [his] whereabouts and the fact that [he] was not involved in the 
assault of Dino Hernandez." (R. 181). More specifically, he claims that he would have 
testified that he "was not present at the scene of the assault of Dino Hernandez" (R. 180). 
Add. D. 
He does not, however, give sufficient detail of his proposed testimony to permit 
this Court to assess its probable impact on the trial. For example, without further detail, 
this Court cannot know whether his testimony would match the testimony of Michelle 
Garcia, Amanda Garay, Rosie Amaro, or none of them. Even assuming his testimony 
would have echoed Garcia's testimony, it would have been cumulative, and defendant 
offers no basis for believing that the jury would have found him to be a credible witness 
when it rejected Garcia's testimony. It would also have opened defendant up to cross-
examination. Because defendant's claim of prejudice requires this Court to engage in 
speculation, the claim does not represent the required "demonstrative reality," and it 
necessarily fails. See Arguelles. 921 P.2d at 441: State v. Severance. 828 P.2d 1066, 
1070 (Utah App. 1992). 
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P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1988) (additional citations omitted), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 966 
(1994). 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM OF ERROR IN ADMISSION OF GANG-
RELATED EVIDENCE FAILS WHERE THE RECORD SHOWS THAT 
TRIAL COUNSEL INVITED ANY ERROR BY HIS PRE-TRIAL 
AGREEMENT TO THE PARTIES' USE OF THE EVIDENCE 
The first point in defendant's brief challenges the trial court's admission of all the 
evidence relating to gangs, including the victim's and defendant's membership in rival 
gangs and the relationship of gangs to the parties' actions.9 Br. of Aplt. at 10-19. 
However, defendant fails to recognize the dispositive fact that the evidence was admitted 
pursuant to the agreement of both parties below. 
The "invited error" doctrine prevents a party from setting up or taking advantage 
of an error at trial and then complaining of that error on appeal. State v. Stevenson, 884 
P.2d 1287, 1292 (Utah App. 1994), cert, denied, 892 P.2d 13 (Utah 1995); State v. 
Perdue. 813 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Utah App. 1991). In this case, defendant's trial counsel 
sought to admit gang-related evidence pertaining to the victim in order to challenge the 
victim's veracity, and agreed to admission of the gang evidence related to defendant in 
order to further his legitimate strategy (see Point I, supra for a discussion of the 
defendant's claim appears to be based on rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, 
inasmuch as that is the sole rule recited by defendant both below and on appeal (R. 149-
54). Br. of Aplt. at 14. However, the exact basis of the claim is unimportant where the 
claim is disposed of under the "invited error'1 doctrine. 
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legitimacy of the strategy). Counsel discussed the agreement with the court prior to trial, 
made no objection to gang-related voir dire questions, raised no objection to gang-related 
evidence during trial, and actively used it in his examination and cross-examination of 
witnesses and in his closing argument. Through his own actions, defendant's trial 
counsel invited whatever error the trial court might otherwise have made in admitting the 
evidence. Accordingly, the invited error doctrine precludes appellate review of this issue. 
Perdue, 813 P.2d at 1205. 
POINT HI 
THE VERDICT WAS SUPPORTED BY AMPLE EVIDENCE PLACING 
DEFENDANT AT THE SCENE OF THE ASSAULT AND ESTABLISHING 
HIS CULPABILITY AS AN AIDER OR ABETTOR, IF NOT AS A 
PRINCIPAL, IN THE OFFENSE 
In his second point on appeal, defendant claims that he was found to be both 
present at and guilty of the assault based solely on his association with the Diamond 
Street gang. Br. of Aplt. at 18. He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence of his 
criminal responsibility, arguing that without the allegedly inadmissible gang-related 
evidence, the remaining evidence established only his "possible" presence at the scene of 
the assault. LI at 19-20. He claims that the only remaining evidence is third- and fourth-
party hearsay evidence concerning the victim's pager lost at the scene of the assault, and 
that this evidence is insufficient to establish defendant's presence. Id at 19. Defendant 
claims that even if the pager evidence shows that he was present during the assault, it 
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does not establish that he participated in or aided and abetted the assault.10 Id. at 19-20. 
However, the evidence establishes more than defendant's mere presence at the scene and 
is sufficient to support the jury's verdict. 
On appeal, this issue is reviewed with great deference to the jury verdict. State v. 
Jiron. 882 P.2d 685, 691 (Utah App. 1994). The evidence and all reasonable inferences 
therefrom are viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. State v. Olsen, 869 
P.2d 1004, 1012 (Utah App. 1994). "'Where there is any evidence, including reasonable 
inferences that can be drawn from it, from which findings of all the elements of the crime 
can be made beyond a reasonable doubt, our inquiry is complete and we will sustain the 
verdict.'" Ikon, 882 P.2d at 691 (quoting State v. Goddard. 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 
1994)) (additional quotation omitted); see also State v. Hall. 946 P.2d 712, 724 (Utah 
App. 1997). Reversal is not warranted unless the evidence is "so inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant committed the crime." Jiron. 882 P.2d at 691. 
Additionally, defendant bears the burden of marshaling the evidence supporting 
the jury's verdict and demonstrating how the evidence, and the reasonable inferences 
therefrom, are insufficient to support the verdict. State v. Strain. 885 P.2d 810, 819 (Utah 
I0Defendant does not contest that the victim was assaulted with a hard object, and 
that the object did serious damage to the victim's head, requiring forty stitches. Further, 
trial counsel conceded that serious bodily injury had occurred (R. 249: 174-75). 
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App. 1994); State v. Pilling. 875 P.2d 604, 607-08 (Utah App. 1994). As a threshold 
matter, defendant has entirely failed to meet this burden. He notes that the non-gang-
related evidence consisted of testimony suggesting that defendant had the victim's pager 
and the victim's voice identification of defendant which "indicated that the victim heard 
Mr. Kandt talking and nothing more." Br. of Aplt. at 19-20. These assertions are wholly 
insufficient to permit review of his claim on appeal. See State v. Galleeos. 851 P.2d 
1185, 1189-90 (Utah App. 1993) ("Failure to marshal the evidence waives an appellant's 
right to have his claim of insufficiency considered on appeal."); State v. Peterson. 841 
P.2d 21, 25 (Utah App. 1992) (no review of a claim of insufficient evidence for which 
defendant made no attempt to marshal the evidence). Defendant's failure becomes clear 
upon a review of the properly marshaled evidence. 
There was no direct evidence that defendant himself struck a blow or wielded the 
object which inflicted the serious bodily injury to the back of the victim's head. 
However, defendant could still be found guilty of the aggravated assault under an aiding 
and abetting theory. The jury instruction given in this case, which defendant does not 
challenge on appeal, stated: 
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of 
the offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands, 
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which 
constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct. 
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(R. 115). This instruction directly quotes Utah law that an agent, aider or abetter is as 
culpable as a principal in the commission of a crime. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1995) 
(attached in Add. A); State v. McCardelL 652 P.2d 942, 945 (Utah 1982). 
As with his other claims, defendant fails to acknowledge that the gang-related 
evidence was admitted pursuant to the parties' agreement. See Points I and II, supra. 
That evidence helped to support the victim's positive identification of defendant's voice, 
placing defendant at the scene, and provided a likely motive for the assault.11 Defendant 
claims that evidence of motive was irrelevant. Br. of Aplt. at 18. However, his trial 
counsel found it important enough to develop and argue (R. 249: 31-43; 250: 226, 231, 
233). Further, motive is often relevant to establishing a crime. State v. Pearson. 943 P.2d 
1347, 1351 (Utah 1997) (approving admission of evidence which was relevant and 
important to motive and intent); State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141,1143-44 (Utah 1989) 
(approving of admission of evidence that was relevant to establishing defendant's motive 
to commit murder); Utah R. Evid. 404(b) (admission of evidence of "other crimes, 
wrongs or acts" may be relevant to show "motive M). 
Even assuming, arguendo, that the gang-related testimony should have been 
omitted, defendant fails to acknowledge the evidence of the multiple prior confrontations 
between himself and the victim, which explained, in part, why the victim was positive 
HThe victim repeatedly reported that he was "jumped" and beaten by three people 
(R. 249: 14-18, 25,45-46, 70). There was a lot of noise and confusion, a lot of yelling 
and screaming, and he heard defendant's voice (R. 249: 17-18, 29-30). 
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about his voice identification and provided a motive for the assault. This evidence can be 
explained without any mention of gang involvement, making it a valid consideration for 
the jury in any event. 
At one point in the trial, the victim implied that defendant retrieved the victim's 
pager at the assault scene and later called various friends of the victim bragging about 
who he was and the assault on the victim (R. 249: 19, 23). Defendant minimizes the 
importance of this testimony, claiming that it was "third and fourth party hearsay" 
supporting only the claim that he was present at the assault. Br. of Aplt. at 19. He does 
not, however, challenge the admission of the testimony. This information not only 
suggests defendant's presence at the assault, but his willingness to be recognized as being 
part of the event, suggesting that he possessed the same intent as the others who were 
present. 
There was additional evidence placing defendant's car at the scene of the assault 
and suggesting that defendant drove the trio to the Pizza Hut. Detective Howell testified 
that defendant owned a gray-silver or silver-gray car around the time of the assault (R. 
249: 83-85), and Melissa Koontz testified that near the time of the assault, she noticed a 
blue-gray car drive to the Pizza Hut and three men get out, two of whom were blacks 
(Dino positively identified his other attackers as two black members of Diamond Street; 
defendant is white) (R. 249: 62-63,66-67, 89). As the trio did nothing except attack Dino 
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and leave, the jury could reasonably believe that their only purpose for being at the Pizza 
Hut was to attack Dino. 
The jury credited the evidence establishing that defendant was present at the 
assault. Nothing in the evidence provides any basis for the jurors to reasonably believe 
that defendant did anything other than encourage, if not participate in, the assaultive acts 
of the others. Nothing suggests that one of the three was hesitant in approaching Dino, 
tried to stop the others' attack, tried to warn Dino or help him, or in any manner 
attempted to terminate his participation in the event. Even defendant failed to suggest 
such an interpretation of the evidence, instead urging the jury to believe that he was not 
even present. Even if the jury concluded that defendant did nothing more than drive the 
car, stand "lookout," watch as the others assaulted Dino, took Dino's pager, then bragged 
about the assault to others, the jury could reasonably find defendant guilty of aiding and 
abetting. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1995) (establishing guilt if a defendant encourages 
or intentionally aides another's criminal conduct with the requisite intent); State v. 
Murphv. 26 Utah 2d 330, 489 P.2d 430,432 (1971) (defendant was a "principal" where 
he drove a codefendant to a jewelry store, waited in the car while the codefendant robbed 
the store and killed the store owner, then drove the codefendant away). 
The evidence established that all three individuals intentionally aided and 
encouraged, if not actively participated in, the assault, whether it be by using their feet 
and fists or by yelling their encouragement to the others. When properly marshaled and 
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viewed in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict, there was sufficient evidence from 
which the jury could convict defendant. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm 
defendant's conviction and sentence. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 7 day of March, 1999. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
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KRIS C. LEONARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Addenda 
Addendum A 
76-2-2C2. Criminal responsibility for direct commission 
of offense or for conduct of another. 
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of an 
offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands, 
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which 
constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct. 
History: C. 1953, 76-2-202, enacted by L. Wildlife Resources Code, J 23-20-23. 
1973, ch. 196, ft 76-2-202. Obstructing justice, ft 76-8-306. 
Cross-References. — Aiding violation of 
76-3-203.1 CRIMINAL CODE 
76-3-203.1. OiTenses committed by three or more persons 
— Enhanced penalties. 
(1) (a) A person who commits any ofTense listed in Subsection (4) in concert 
with two or more persons is subject to an enhanced penalty for the ofTense 
as provided below. 
(b) "In concert with two or more persons" as used in this section means 
the defendant and two or more other persons would be criminally liable for 
the ofTense as parties under Section 76-2-202. 
(2) (a) The prosecuting attorney, or grand jury if an indictment is returned, 
shall cause to be subscribed upon the complaint in misdemeanor cases or 
the information or indictment in felony cases notice that the defendant is 
subject to the enhanced penalties provided under this section. The notice 
shall be in a clause separate from and in addition to the substantive 
ofTense charged. 
(b) If the subscription is not included initially, the court may subse-
quently allow the prosecutor to amend the charging document to include 
the subscription if the court finds the charging documents, including any 
statement of probable cause, provide notice to the defendant of the 
allegation he committed the ofTense in concert with two or more persons, 
or if the court finds the defendant has not otherwise been substantially 
prejudiced by the omission. 
(3) The enhanced penalties for offenses committed under this section are: 
(a) If the ofTense is a class B misdemeanor, the convicted person shall 
serve a minimum term of 90 consecutive days in a jail or other secure 
correctional facility. 
(b) If the ofTense is a class A misdemeanor, the convicted person shall 
serve a minimum term of 180 consecutive days in a jail or other secure 
correctional facility. 
(c) If the ofTense is a third degree felony, the convicted person shall be 
sentenced to an enhanced minimum term of three years in prison. 
(d) If the ofTense is a second degree felony, the convicted person shall be 
sentenced to an enhanced minimum term of six years in prison. 
(e) If the ofTense is a first degree felony, the convicted person shall be 
sentenced to an enhanced minimum term of nine years in prison. 
(f) If the ofTense is a capital ofTense for which a life sentence is imposed, 
the convicted person shall be sentenced to a minimum term of 20 years in 
prison. 
(4) Offenses referred to in Subsection (1) are: 
(a) any criminal violation of Title 58, Chapter 37, 37a, 37b, or 37c, 
regarding drug-related offenses; 
(b) assault and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 1; 
(c) any criminal homicide offense under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 2; 
(d) kidnapping and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 3; 
(e) any felony sexual offense under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4; 
(f) sexual exploitation of a minor as defined in Section 76-5a-3; 
(g) any property destruction offense under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 1; 
(h) burglary, criminal trespass, and related offenses under Title 76, 
Chapter 6, Part 2; 
(i) robl>ery and aggravated robbery under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 3; 
(j) theft and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 4; 
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(k) any fraud offense under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 5, except Sections 
76-6-503, 76-6-504, 76-6-505, 76-6-507, 76-6-508, 76-6-509, 76-6-510, 76-
6-511, 76-6-512, 76-6-513, 76-6-514, 76-6-516, 76-6-517, 76-6-518, and 
76-6-520; 
(1) any offense of obstructing government operations under Part 3, Title 
76, Chapter 8, except Sections 76-8-302, 76-8-303, 76-8-304, 76-8-307, 
76-8-308, and 76-8-312; 
(m) tampering with a witness or other violation of Section 76-8-508; 
(n) extortion or bribery to dismiss criminal proceeding as defined in 
Section 76-8-509; 
(o) any explosives offense under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 3; 
(p) any weapons offense under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 5; 
(q) pornographic and harmful materials and performances offenses 
under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 12; 
(r) prostitution and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 13; 
(s) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 15, Bus Passenger Safety 
Act; 
(t) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 16, Pattern of Unlawful 
Activity Act; 
(u) communications fraud as defined in Section 76-10-1801; 
(v) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 19, Money Laundering 
and Currency Transaction Reporting Act; and 
(w) burglary of a research facility as defined in Section 76-10-2002. 
(5) (a) This section does not create any separate ofTense but provides an 
enhanced penalty for the primary offense. 
(b) It is not a bar to imposing the enhanced penalties under this section 
that the persons with whom the actor is alleged to have acted in concert 
are not identified, apprehended, charged, or convicted, or that any of those 
persons are charged with or convicted of a different or lesser offense. 
(c) The sentencing judge rather than the jury shall decide whether to 
impose the enhanced penalty under this section. The imposition of the 
penalty is contingent upon a finding by the sentencing judge that this 
section is applicable. In conjunction with sentencing the court shall enter 
written findings of fact concerning the applicability of this section. 
(6) The court may suspend the imposition or execution of the sentence 
required under this section if the court: 
(a) finds that the interests of justice would be best served; and 
(b) states the specific circumstances justifying the disposition on the 
record and in writing. 
History: C 1953,76-3-203.1, enacted by L. 
1990, ch . 207, S 1; 1994, ch. 12, t 108. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-
ANALYSIS 
Findings or fact. 
Mental state of parties. 
Findings of fact. 
Even though the trial court did not make 
written findings offset concerning applicability 
ment, effective May 2, 1994, corrected the ref-
erence in Subsection (lXa). 
of the enhanced penalty as it was obliged to do 
under this section, failure of defendant to object 
to the enhancement precluded consideration of 
the issue on appeal. State v. Labrum, 246 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 11 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Mental atate of parties. 
For this section to apply, a defendant must 
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76-5-103. Aggravated assault. 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in 
Section 76-5-102 and he: 
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or 
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection 
(lXa), uses a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other 
means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury. 
(2) A violation of Subsection (lXa) is a second degree felony. 
(3) A violation of Subsection (1Kb) is a third degree felony. 
History: C. 1953, 76-5-103, enacted by L. Subsection (lXa)" to the beginning of Subsec-
1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-103; 1974, ch. 32, $ 10; tion (1Kb); substituted "A violation of Subsec-
1989, ch. 170, § 2; 1995, ch. 291, § 5. tion (lMa)" for "Aggravated assault" and "sec-
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend- ond degree" for "third degree" in Subsection (2); 
roent, effective May 1, 1995, added "under and added Subsection (3). 
circumstances not amounting to a violation of 
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future threats and not to go into that. 
And then the witnesses, including Mr. Kandt, 
could cone forward and testify and the very weak evidence 
offered by the State could—could be held under scrutiny 
of the due process of a fair trial, which didn't occur at 
the last proceedings. 
And we would respectfully ask the Court to 
grant the notion for a new trial. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Mr. Castle, would you like to respond? 
MR. CASTLE: I would, your Honor. 
Your Honor, from the State's perspective, the 
standard in which you need to judge whether a new trial 
I should be awarded is based on the standards articulated 
15
 I in Strickland vs. Washington. I know Mr. Gaither 
16
 ' referred to that case, but did not refer to the standards 
17
 I the Court articulated in terms of whether a new trial 
should be awarded in this particular case. 
And before I talk about those standards, your 
Honor, I know that Mr. Gaither in his argunent has 
outlined his argunent in—in terns of there was evidence 
that was offered that should have been objected to that 
prejudiced ny client. And then he talks about how 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
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24
 counsel was ineffective and, your Honor, fron ny 
25 perspective, really, they're one and the sane. 
27 
The question to be asked is whether or not Mr. 
Angerhofer was ineffective in his assistance of Mr* Kandt 
during this trial. 
Going back to the test articulated in 
Strickland vs. Washington, there are two prongs; one 
prong being, did counsel's performance fall below an 
objective standard of reasonableness and whether 
counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant. And Mr. 
Kandt actually is required to satisfy both of those 
standards and I would submit at this point, they—they 
have not in any way satisfied those standards, 
particularly, number one, they can't even get past the 
first hurdle. 
And as indicated in Strickland vs. Washington, 
a strong presumption that defense—there is a strong 
presumption against defense counsel's conduct falling 
outside of the wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance. This court will not second guess trial 
counsel's legitimate, strategic choices, however flawed 
those choices might appear in retrospect. 
And in stating that standard, your Honor, I 
need to go back to the trial and some conversations we 
had in your chambers, conversations we had with the jury 
was voir dired. 
Your Honor, you'll recall that prior to the 
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trial starting, me and Mr. Angerhofer met with you in 
your chambers. The purpose of that meeting was to 
discuss this very issue about gang membership and what to 
do about that. 
And the reason for that is because it was clear 
and I never contested the issue, that Mr. Dino Hernandez 
was a gang member. He was a gang member of Salt Lake 
Posse and he was a rival gang member of Diamond Street. 
The reason that was important to Mr. Angerhofer 
is because, for him, that was a source of impeachment 
which he could pursue against Mr. Hernandez. He's a 
rival gang member, he's biased, he has a motive for 
dragging Mr. Kandt into this legal process. And Mr. 
Angerhofer recognized that. 
But what's good for the goose is good for the 
gander, your Honor, and that's really why we were talking 
about gang membership. If Mr. Angerhofer was going to 
18
 [ cross-examine Mr. Hernandez on his gang membership and 
why he might be less than truthful, then it was only fair 
that the State have the opportunity to explore the fact 
that Mr. Kandt was—was a member of Diamond Street, which 
is a rival gang. 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 And my opening statement and maybe you'll 
24 recall that, would never have been given the way I gave 
25
 it had we not had that agreement. And my opening 
29 
statement, the fact there were no objections/ represents 
the agreement we had, I had with Mr. Angerhofer, the 
agreement we talked about with the Court in your 
chambers. The questions that I asked Mr. Hernandez were 
questions asked based on that agreement, and that 
agreement is evidenced by the fact that I asked those 
questions and those questions were not objected to. 
Now, one thing I did in the trial in terms of a 
trial tactic is, I brought out right from the beginning 
Mr. Hernandez' gang affiliation. The reason I did that 
was simply to get it out of the gate before Mr. 
Angerhofer did. That was a trial tactic on my part. And 
in terms of the gang information that was provided, but 
also as part of Mr. Angerhofer's trial strategy. 
There's absolutely been no evidence, no 
argument made that somehow, his trial strategy falls 
below that reasonable professional assistance standard 
articulated in Strickland ygt Washington* This was part 
of his trial strategy. 
I know in Mr. Gaither's brief, he indicated 
that, particularly in his reply brief, that the reason 
Mr. Angerhofer did what he did on cross-examination, 
meaning bringing up the gang association, bringing up the 
fact that Mr. Hernandez had been with a fellow gang 
member when they threw a lug nut through Mr. Kandt's 
30 
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window is because I started it. Well, that's not the 
truth at all. It was something that was agreed on in the 
beginning, it was part of Mr. Angerhofer's trial strategy 
that for—the way for him to impeach Mr. Hernandez, to 
question his motive, to question his bias, was to bring 
out the fact he was a gang member and was a rival gang 
member. 
Your Honor, in terms of some of these other 
questions that I asked Mr. Hernandez about his house 
being shot up, it had to do with his reluctance to be a 
witness in Court. The fact that he was subpoenaed and 
required to be here, yes, he didn't have a choice but we 
know a witness can take the stand and say, I'm just not 
talking and the Court can hold that person in contempt 
for a 30-day period and that's the only penalty imposed 
upon that person. 
What I was attempting to show the jury is that 
there are legitimate reasons why Mr. Hernandez didn't 
want to testify. It just didn't have to do with the fact 
that he was hand served, that was the beginning. The 
beginning of the fact that in his own mind, he faced some 
real dangers by coming to Court and testifying. Even 
though he's a rival gang member, he is violating a code 
24
 of conduct among all gang members about coming to court 
25
 and about testifying. 
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 ' And the reason the question was asked about his 
2
 home is because he had made the statement to the police, 
3
 | I'm telling you this story about what happened, I just 
want you to watch my house but I don't want to do 
5
 anything about this, I don't want to pursue it. And your 
6
 Honor, the person who pursued this case was me. I was 
7
 the one that decided not to give Mr. Hernandez a choice 
8
 and I think I was entitled to ask him those questions 
9
 I that demonstrated his reluctance, why he didn't want to 
come. 
Z mean we act like somehow this event occurred 
12
 I in some sterile environment and it didn't. It occurred 
13
 because Mr. Hernandez and his friend, whether it was Mr. 
14
 Hernandez or his friend, threw that lug nut through Mr. 
15
 I Kandt's window and Mr. Kandt was back to retaliate. That 
is part of the gang culture, that's part of the gang 
conduct. 
And under Rule 404(b)* I'm entitled to offer 
19
 I evidence about motive. And what I was also trying to 
20 I present in this case and that'* why it was relevant is 
21
 I the motive that Mr. Kandt had in performing this assault 
22
 I on Mr. Hernandez. And that's why that testimony was 
23
 offered, because Mr. Kandt, from the State's perspective 
24
 had a motive and that was one of retaliation. 
25
 Your Honor, you'll recall we spent a lot of 
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tine with the jury prior to empaneling one, asking 
questions about gang affiliation, gang membership, 
whether or not that would affect their ability to make a 
decision based on just the facts of the case and those 
that admitted that they could not, we eliminated those 
from the jury pool. 
And I bring that up again because, your Honor, 
that's further evidence that we had an agreement, me and 
Mr. Angerhofer, with the Court, that we would be talking 
about gang membership. That it was part of my strategy 
in the case, but it was also part of Mr. Angerhofer's 
strategy. 
Now, I know Mr. Gaither, in looking at the 
transcript that he provided to me, does not have the 
information about the voir dire of the jury and it's 
evident that he hasn't talked to Mr. Angerhofer either, 
because had he had the portion of the voir dire 
transcribed, he would have seen that we spent quite a bit 
of time and you'll remember this, in talking with the 
jury about gang membership; in fact, during the voir dire 
of the jury, we had a fight outside with rival gang 
22
 | members. And there was inquiry into that, whether that 
23
 I was going to affect the ability of the jurors to be 
24
 ' objective, be unbiased and be fair in terms of hearing 
25
 I the—the testimony. 
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I know that we were concerned about whether 
that had affected them and we—we discovered that no, it 
had not, that they were not aware of that fight that had 
occurred outside. 
So, your Honor, going back to that first 
standard of Strickland, I would submit that what Mr. 
Angerhofer did was part of his trial strategy. That's 
why gang membership issues came up because that was also 
part of his strategy, that's why he did not object. 
So we're really not talking about whether Mr. 
Angerhofer should have objected, we're not really talking 
about whether these were errors that were committed that 
you need to look at as a whole and decide whether Mr. 
Kandt was given a fair trial, because that was part of 
Mr. Angerhofer's strategy. 
That's the question. That's the standard. 
Does it fall below the objective standard of reasonable 
assistance? That's the standard we're looking at. And I 
would submit, your Honor, that it—it doesn't, that Mr. 
Kandt has not, in any way, shown that what Mr. Angerhofer 
did falls below that standard. 
I mean it's easy now to look back, after Mr. 
Kandt was convicted and say, oh, wait a minute. My 
defense counsel didn't do his job; but as the courts have 
said, as said in Strickland vs. Washington. State Y&JU 
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Tennesonr the Court can't second guess legitimate trial 
tactics, even if—even if they look flawed at this point 
in the proceeding. 
Your Honor, with respect to the additional 
witnesses that Mr. Gaither indicates that Mr. Kandt would 
have called, now, in retrospect; Amanda (inaudible), your 
Honor, it should be noted that she was here for the trial 
and present and identified as one of Mr. Kandt's 
witnesses during the trial. But her affidavit, 
interestingly enough, contradicts Ms. Garcia's testimony 
about who left in which car and where they went. 
I should also mention that Mr. Angerhofer 
represented to me the reason he was not calling her is 
because he was concerned that she would contradict 
I Michelle Garcia's testimony and by contradicting her 
testimony, would dilute the value of Ms. Garcia's 
testimony. 
As to Rosie Armaro, your Honor, Mr. Angerhofer 
represented to me that she just failed to show up for 
court. That's why he didn't call her. 
As to Anthony Wallace, there was reference in 
22
 I the memorandum as to that. You'll recall that Mr. 
23
 Angerhofer, after consulting with Mr. Kandt, represented 
24
 on the record that they had decided not to call him. Had 
25
 Mr. Wallace been called, I would have called Detective 
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Rich Montenez, your Honor. Mr. Montenez informed me 
during the trial that Mr. Wallace had indicated to him 
that Mr. Kandt had asked him to lie about him being at 
the Pizza Hut when this assault occurred and that Mr. 
Wallace was relieved he didn't have to be called because 
he would have perjured himself. 
As to Mr. Kandt, there was also discussion and 
it can be seen on the videotape that Mr. Angerhofer had 
with Mr. Kandt and that a representation made to the 
court by Mr. Angerhofer that Mr. Kandt wouldn't testify. 
And you know# for Mr. Kandt, it's not as easy 
as he thinks it is. His testimony wouldn't be restricted 
just to that affidavit he's filed with this case, I'd 
have the opportunity to cross-examine, I'd have the 
opportunity to cross-examination on each little motive 
and that's related to his gang membership. I would have 
the opportunity to cross-examine him on bias, that's 
related to his gang membership. I'd be able to do all 
that because I would be able to cross-examine on his 
veracity. 
And Mr. Kandt can't have his cake and eat it 
too. He can't get up there and think he's not going to 
be asked those questions, when they're very relevant to 
his motive, to his bias and what he has become here in 
this valley, he is a gang member. And had Mr. Kandt been 
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called, as well as these other witnesses, your Honor, sty 
strategy would have been different in terms of how I 
would have handled then. 
In fact, what would have happened, Mr. Howe's 
testimony, Mr. Fritz' testimony would have been even more 
relevant had Mr. Kandt taken the testimony (sic) and 
denied his membership and somehow tried to tell the jury 
the reason he has Diamond Street tattooed all over his 
body is because his first name is Denny. That's a bunch 
of baloney. He has that, tattoos on his body because 
he's a member of Diamond Street; in fact, the information 
12 I 
I the State has is that he is one of the leaders of Diamond 
Street. 
Your Honor, this case was based on the 
testimony of Dino Hernandez, but it was based on the 
testimony of an uncooperative witness, the State will 
admit that, and the State will admit that Mr. Hernandez 
gave several different stories. 
He gave one story to the police. He gave one 
story at the preliminary hearing. He gave another 
slightly different story at trial and that's why 
Detective Fritz was called, your Honor, to testify as to 
what Dino was telling him shortly after the incident 
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 occurred. When's his testimony going to be most reliable 
25
 or in terms of remembering what happened, it'll be most 
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reliable shortly after the event occurred. 
And your Honor, under Rule 613 of the Rules of 
Evidence, the State is allowed to bring other witnesses 
in where one witness has made a statement to that witness 
and then on the stand either doesn't remember it or 
denies making that statement, and the reason Detective 
Fritz was called to the stand was to testify as to what 
Dino had said before. The State's allowed to impeach 
its own witness and through the use of Detective Fritz, 
what the State was doing was simply corroborating what 
I Mr. Hernandez had said before. 
And in terms of identification, voice as well 
as a face, is good enough. That's competent evidence. 
To identify someone by the sound of their voice or by the 
15
 fact that he saw him. 
16
 And I should indicate, your Honor, that Mr. 
17
 I Hernandez indicated at the preliminary hearing, that it 
was Denny Kandt, there was no question in his mind at 
that point, that's what he told the police officers and 
then when he got to trial, he did what he did with Mr. 
Lopez during the preliminary hearing and that is, you 
know, I just remember a voice, I don't remember a face. 
Your Honor, Mr. Hernandez was not a cooperative 
witness. He was a witness up there trying to minimize 
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 what might happen to him for testifying and the case that 
38 
I put forth to the jury was an effort to corroborate the 
fact that this event occurred, that Mr. Kandt was 
involved with Mr. Lopez and Mr. Wallace, that they were 
guilty of an aggravated assault because they used some 
dangerous weapon. It's true, we didn't ever figure out 
really what it was, whether it was a rock or something 
else; but the whole reason I called in the Pizza Hut 
fellow was to indicate as corroborative evidence of the 
nature of the injury that Mr. Hernandez suffered. 
Your Honor, we also had a young woman testify 
about seeing three people, two of which were black. Mr. 
Lopez and Mr. Wallace, as established during the trial, 
are both black. There was also discussions about a car, 
a car similar in color as well as similar in size to Mr. 
Kandt. That was testified to by Detective Howe as well 
as this other civilian witness. 
Your Honor, as to this area of argument Mr. 
Gaither has indicated on the issue of being a snitch, 
he's guessing as to why you asked me to move on. I don't 
know why you asked me to move on. It's not because— 
based on what you said later, it was because I could not 
ask that question and you simply instructed me to ask 
that at a different time. I don't think that was that 
you were indicating somehow that was improper, but simply 
directing me to do it later on if I so chose to do. 
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Your Honor, with respect, going back to the 
witnesses that Mr. Kandt wished he would have called, 
your Honor, all of those witnesses could have been cross-
examined based on bias, motive to lie, motive to be here 
for Mr. Kandt. All of them except for Rosie are 
associated with Mr. Kandt. They're not just his friends, 
they are associates of his gang. That presents a unique 
issue, a unique issue for cross-examination because it 
goes back to what I said a couple times, I said a couple 
of times during the trial as well as today; there is a 
code of conduct among gang members that's unique to that 
12 I 
' | association and the State at least would have petitioned 
13 
' the Court for the opportunity to cross-examine them on 
their bias, that being their association with Diamond 
15
 I Street gang members including Mr. Kandt and my 
understanding is that Amanda Gurule was and still might 
be Mr. Kandt's girlfriend. 
So to say that somehow these witnesses would 
have changed the outcome is simply speculative based on 
the fact that their affidavits are inconsistent with Mr.-
-with Ms. Garcia's testimony and the fact that Anthony 
Wallace had admitted to Detective Rich Montenez what the 
plan was in terms of his testimony. 
24
 I Your Honor, I'd ask the Court to deny the 
25
 motion. Mr. Kandt has not satisfied either of the two 
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standards required under Strickland vs. Washington and 
the Utah case law concerning trial strategy. That's what 
this simply was, trial strategy on Mr. Angerhofer's part. 
He took advantage of the fact that Mr* 
Hernandez was a gang member both on cross-examination as 
well as in his closing argument, that this was something 
motivated simply because of the rivalry between the two 
groups• 
And would ask that you deny the motion. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Mr. Gaither, your rebuttal? 
MR. GAITHER: Thank you. 
I would submit that the statements made by the 
prosecutor concerning Mr. Kandt and that he has become 
and is known as a gang member and that he is believed by 
some to be a leader of a certain gang essentially again 
indicates the approach taken by the prosecution in this 
case and I would submit the—the real issues were lost by 
this gang evidence. 
The fact that Mr. Kandt's vehicle, he would 
have testified that the color of his vehicle wasn't the 
color that was observed by these persons; the fact that 
he was just not there, he was not present and did not— 
24
 I couldn't have participated in—in this assault of Dino 
25
 Hernandez. 
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evidence that the State has, requires that this natter 
be—that my client be awarded a new trial and we would 
request that, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. GAITHER: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Counsel, I had an 
opportunity to review your memos before the hearing today 
and I appreciate receiving those and having an 
opportunity to do so. 
Based upon my review of the memoranda and also 
your argument, I'm going to deny the motion for a new 
trial. 
While in hindsight the things that former 
counsel did might have appeared to have been mistaken 
strategy, I think it very clearly was part of his trial 
strategy; in other words, that the victim was a gang 
member who was assaulted by rival gang members but we 
weren't there. 
And in fact, that was said in conversation 
between counsel and I. I don't recall at what stage of 
the proceedings it was, it may have been when we were 
discussing witnesses or it may have been during voir dire 
process or at some other point, but that was raised 
because counsel both made it clear to me that part of the 
defendant's trial strategy was to allow that evidence in 
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because their defense was he wasn't there, so it didn't 
really matter. 
It also appears to me that had that not been 
part of the trial strategy, much of that clearly went to 
motive, to explain an otherwise unexplainable assault. 
In terms of the witnesses who did not testify, 
there was one witnesses—one witness, I believe, Ms. 
Garcia, who did testify for Mr. Kandt. I don't recall 
specifically her testimony. I do recall during the 
course of the trial that Mr. Angerhofer indicated there 
was a second witness that he would be calling and that 
once Ms. Garcia testified, he changed his mind. 
Now, I'm not part of his thinking process on 
that. I can only assume he made that determination after 
listening to her testimony and knowing what he knew about 
the status of the evidence at that point. He didn't fail 
to have other witnesses available, in fact, they were 
here and he made a determination, after hearing Ms. 
Garcia testify, that he would not call the others. 
I don't think any of that rises to the level of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. I think he had a pre-
conceived idea of how he wanted this case to go and as I 
started out by saying, in hindsight, we may disagree with 
that. It was his strategy and he had every opportunity 
to pursue that for Mr. Kandt's benefit. 
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And so based upon all of that, the motion for a 
new trial is denied. 
I'm going to ask Mr. Castle to prepare an order 
consistent with that. 
Is there anything else that we need to address 
today that you're aware of, Counsel? 
MR. CASTLE: Your Honor, in Mr. 
Gaither's memorandum, he did bring up the issue of the 
group enhancement. I simply raise that because it was in 
his memo. 
Z know we talked about it at the time of 
sentencing, we talked about it at the time the verdict 
was rendered, but there it is again. So I don't know 
what you want to do with it, I don't know what Mr. 
Gaither wants— 
THE COURT: I've already made my 
ruling. 
MR. CASTLE: Okay. 
THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. 
Gaither? 
21
 I MR. GAITHER: Your Honor, nothing 
22 
else. 
That—that issue was raised because we didn't 
24
 want to indicate there was any waiver of the objections 
25
 that were made and I would incorporate the objections and 
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1 subpoenaed here to tell you what has happened. Because 
2 the law is such that when there is a violation of the 
3 law, the person who's violated the law, has to answer for 
4 the consequences. 
5 After all the evidence has been presented, I 
g will return here and speak to you again and when I do 
j that, I'm going to ask you to carefully consider all of 
8 the evidence that you've heard and base your decision 
g just on that evidence, base your decision just on the law 
that the Court has given you, to set aside any bias you 
might have in considering that evidence, and when I 
^2 I return, I will be asking you to find Denny Kandt guilty 
13 I of aggravated assault, and that's what he's been charged 
14 I with. 
15 I He's been charged with either being the one who 
16 I struck Dino Hernandez in the head with this object or 
17 being someone that was there, who was aiding and 
10 
11 
18 
20 
21 
23 
24 
25 
abetting others to do the same. 
19 Thank you, 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Castle. 
And Mr. Angerhofer, do you wish to make an 
22 opening statement at this time? 
MR. ANGERHOFER: Yes, please. 
May it please the Court, learned Counsel, 
ladies and gentlemen of the jury. The prosecution has 
173 
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16 
painted a pretty grim picture of the crime—or the gang 
2 I scene in Salt Lake City and I'm not here to dispute that, 
3 I'm not—this case today is not about cleaning up the 
4 streets of Salt Lake, getting rid of the gang problem. 
5 That's not the issue and that's not going to happen any 
6 time soon. 
j If that was the case, it would be really easy 
8 to solve our gang problem in Salt Lake; however, you'll 
g remember, as the Judge asked you as we were selecting you 
for the jury, if you could independently, impartially and 
without bias, reach a decision in this case after 
considering all of the evidence and not being influenced 
one way or the other by the mention of whether witnesses 
or the defendant are members of a gang. That is not the 
issue here, being a member of a gang is not a crime. 
Aggravated assault, however, is a crime. 
17 And with that, the State has to show two things 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
beyond a reasonable doubt: That a crime was committed, 
in other words, that the victim was assaulted, that he 
sustained injuries. We don't dispute that, the medical 
evidence will show that he did in fact require stitches, 
he was taken to the hospital. There's no dispute there. 
What this case focuses on, though, is who did 
it? Who inflicted the wound? Who assaulted Dino 
Hernandez? That is what we're asking you to do here 
174 
«l today. 
2 Listen to the evidence—you'll hear conflicting 
3 evidence, by the way. Juries often do. As you listen to 
4 each person that testifies, I would ask that you consider 
5 their credibility, consider what they have to say and ask 
6 particularly if they're telling the truth, for when you 
7 go back into the jury room, you'll be asked to weigh 
3 everything that you've heard today and come to a 
g conclusion, guilt or innocence of this defendant. 
JO Not whether or not a crime has been committed, 
jj not whether Dino has sustained an injury, we know that. 
J2 Not whether or not the gang problem exists in Salt Lake, 
j3 We know that. Not whether any particular member, the 
defendant, witness or whoever is a member of a gang. We 
know that, and that's not an issue, that's not a crime. 
What we have to ask, though, as you listen to 
14 
15 
16 
17 the evidence, it will show that the defendant, Denny, was 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
not present at the crime scene on the day this crime 
occurred. This crime occurred on—on July 28th, 1997, 
around 5:30, 6;00 o'clock p.m. at the Pizza Hut. That's 
been well established, it'll come out today, you'll see 
the evidence before it. 
But you'll also find evidence, Michelle Garcia, 
a friend of Denny's, Amanda Garay, a friend of Denny's, 
they were both here with Denny at the courthouse on that 
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^ day, between 3:00 o'clock and 5:30 p.m. From 5:30 p.m., 
2 all three of them went to Michelle's and Amanda's house, 
3 watched a movie called Happy Gilmore. And you believe or 
4 not believe. 
5 They didn't get out~then~then Denny had to go 
6 home, it's 10:00, 10:30 at night, she left, and Denny was 
j not out of their sight from about 3:00 o'clock in the 
8 afternoon until about 10:30 at night. Well, if the crime 
g occurred at 5:30—and by the way, the evidence will show 
that the defendant—or the victim, rather, Dino, checked 
in to L.D.S. Hospital about 6:40 p.m. on the 28th; so, 
some time between 5:30 p.m. to 6:40 p.m., he was 
assaulted, went to the hospital, got his treatment. 
Denny was nowhere near, the evidence will show he was 
15 some place else. 
16 
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Well, now, wait a minute, you say, how can that 
17 be? Already we have a conflict. The victim's going to 
be saying that Denny did it to him. Denny's friends will 
be saying, No, he was with us all the time. Somebody is 
telling a lie here and that's what you'll be asked to 
listen to today as you listen to every single witness who 
gets on that witness stand, look at them, use all of your 
experience of human nature concerning truth or lie, as 
each witness is on that stand and ask, Who's telling the 
truth here? Who's telling a lie? 
176 
1 What motivation would anyone have to tell the 
2 truth here or a lie? Well, the evidence will show that 
3 Dino testified under oath at a prior hearing and at that 
4 prior hearing, he admitted to being a gang member, he 
5 admitted prior confrontations with Denny, in which a 
6 friend of the victim, a friend of Dino's, threw a rock 
7 through—at Denny's house. 
8 Dino, the victim, will testify that he held a 
g grudge against Denny. Consider that and consider—ask 
10 motivation when Dino gets on the stand. Why are you 
H telling us the things you're saying? Listen to his 
12 testimony. 
The evidence will show that as Dino checked 
into the hospital, he told one story. He said that prior 
gang members were trying to get him back into a gang that 
1g I he used to belong to but no longer was in the gang. That 
17 was the day of the assault. 
Two days later, the evidence will indicate that 
Dino was talking to a Detective Vu and a Detective 
Rivera. He told them—let me get it right here, 'cause 
it changes it here—he will tell him—he told two days 
later that Dino, the victim, threw the first punch at a 
Mr. Lopes and then Mr. Lopes hits him with the rock. 
And then about five days later, on August 5th, 
Dino, the victim, states to a Detective Thomas this time, 
13 
14 
15 
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1 a different detective, but within the weak, that Anthony 
2 Wallace threw the first swing at him and that again, it 
3 was Lopes that hit him. 
4 At the only time which he's put under oath at a 
5 prior hearing, Dino, the victim, will say he doesn't know 
6 who hit him with a rock. 
7 I So, we have at least three, maybe four 
8 different stories. As you listen to whatever story Dino 
9 tells today, ask yourself, motivation and whether or not 
he's telling the truth or lying, for that is critical. 
We have opposing stories here, contradicting stories. 
Your job is to determine who's telling the truth. 
13 I Thank you. 
14 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. 
15 Angerhofer. 
Mr. Castle, will you call your first witness. 
1 7 I MR. CASTLE: Thank you, your Honor. 
Dino Hernandez. 
THE COURT: Will you come forward, 
please, to where my clerk is and I'll ask her to 
administer the oath. 
10 
11 
12 
18 
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2 2 J (Further proceedings previously transcribed.) 
THE COURT: Get on and off in 20 
minutes? 
23 
24 
„_ I MR. CASTLE: Could I approach the 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DIVISION I 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DENNY DUKE KANDT, : 
Defendant. : 
: AFFIDAVIT OF AMANDA GARAY 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR A 
: NEW TRIAL OF THE DEFENDANT, 
DENNY DUKE KANDT 
Judge PEULER 
: Case No. 971901021 FS 
State Of Utah ) 
:ss 
County Of Salt Lake ) 
I, AMANDA GARAY, being first duly sworn upon my oath deposes and states as 
follows: 
1. I am a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah and I am employed at the 
Salt Lake County Recorders Office. 
2. I know and am acquainted with Denny Kandt. 
3. On July 28,1997,1 was in Court in the Third Judicial District Court and 
Denny Kandt was present at the hearing. 
1 
4. After Court, Amber Lloyd, Anabell Martinez, Denny Kandt and I talked with 
Mr. Molina's mother outside the Third Judicial District Court courtroom for a 
considerable period of time. Then Denny Kandt, Amber Lloyd and Anabell Martinez left 
in my Mercury Sable and left for Michelle Garcia's residence. 
5. Myself, Michelle Garcia, Amber Lloyd, Anabell Martinez and Denny Kandt 
/went from Court directly to Michelle AMANDA GARAY's house in the Rose Park area 
of Salt Lake City. 
6. After leaving the residence we watched a video and played Monopoly. We 
played Monopoly until about 10:00 p.m. or 10:30 p.m. During this time, Denny Kandt 
was present either at Salt Lake District Court, in the car or at the residence and never left 
to go to any other location in Salt Lake County. ^ ? / / ^ ^ ' > / ^ / ^ X ^ ^ 7 " 
/A/d/uaW? JOclttl?'* ?/<#*'** cyq. 
7. I was willing to testify if called as a witness on behalf of Denny Kandt and I 
am still willing to testify to the fact that Denny Kandt could not have been at the place 
where Mr. Hernandez was assaulted. 
8. I was present at the trial but was not called to testify. 
n DATED this / 1 day of January, 1998. 
JWANDA OAR AY 0 AMANDA GARAY 
State Of Utah ) 
:ss 
County Of Salt Lake ) 
On the _J_Zpay of January, 1998, personally appeared before me, AMANDA 
GARAY, having read the foregoing Affidavit, swears that the contents thereof are true 
according to the best of information and belief and has executed the same. 
Rotary "Seal: ^"8® £$^""1 
I, . •-, _ 321 South600East I 
II -iH Sfi'La*^ City. Utah 84121 ! 
! \ .v .-S//J My Commistion Expire* I 
Notary \Public 
I hereby certify that on the 
FAX/MAILING CERTIFICATE 
day of January, 1998, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT was faxed/mailed First Class, postage prepaid to: 
CYH. CASTLE 
DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY 
231 EAST 400 SOUTH, SUITE 300 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
DATED this. H. day of January, 1998. 
3 
RANDALL GAITHER, #1141 
Attorney for DENNY DUKE KANDT 
321 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801)531-1990 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DIVISION I 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
DENNY DUKE KANDT, : 
Defendant. : 
: AFFIDAVIT OF DENNY KANDT 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR A 
: NEW TRIAL OF THE DEFENDANT, 
DENNY DUKE KANDT 
Judge PEULER 
: Case No. 971901021 FS 
State Of Utah ) 
:ss 
County Of Salt Lake ) 
I, Denny Duke Kandt, being first duly sworn upon my oath deposes and states as 
follows: 
1. I am the Defendant in the above entitled matter. 
2. I was willing to testify in my defense and if I had been called to the stand, I 
would have testified that I was not present at the scene of the assault of Dino Hernandez. 
3. I do not believe that my appointed counsel fairly discussed with me the reasons 
why he advised me not to testify at Trial. I was willing to testify before the jury and 
1 
subject myself to cross examination by the Prosecution. 
4. If a new Trial is ordered in this matter I would testify as to my whereabouts and 
the fact that I was not involved in the assault of Dino Hernandez. 
5. I do not believe that my prior attorney effectively developed my alibi defense 
and I, along with my father, had given him information as to other witnesses who I 
believe would have supported each other's testimony to corroborate the fact that I was 
not present and did not participate in the assault. 
6. I request that the Court grant a new trial in this matter. 
DATED this ( I day of January, 1998. 
JW^A^CT 
l5ENNY£tjKEKANDT 
State Of Utah ) 
:ss 
County Of Salt Lake ) 
On the day of January, 1998, personally appeared before me, Denny Duke 
Kandt, having read the foregoing Affidavit, swears that the contents thereof are true 
according to the best of information and belief and has executed the same. 
Notary Seal: Notar^Public/ 
fP ~ZSL~ITmmmmtm wctarv Public _ ! 
I / sSSkv RANDMX GAITHEH I 
! / > ^ 2 w f t 321 South 600 East | 
1
 - & * M )!1 Salt Lake City. Utah,84121 , 
I hereby certify that on the 
FAX/MAILING CERTIFICATE 
eh 
t / day of January, 1998, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT was faxed/mailed First Class, postage prepaid to: 
CYH. CASTLE 
DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY 
231 EAST 400 SOUTH, SUITE 300 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
DATED this. H day of January, 1998. 
3 
RANDALL GAITHER, #1141 
Attorney for DENNY DUKE KANDT 
321 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801)531-1990 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DIVISION I 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DENNY DUKE KANDT, 
Defendant. 
) 
:ss 
AFFIDAVIT OF ROSIE AMARO 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR A 
NEW TRIAL OF THE DEFENDANT, 
DENNV m TKF K AMT^T 
Judge PEULER 
Case No. 971901021 FS 
State Of Utah 
County Of Salt Lake ) 
. . AMARO, being first duly sworn upon my oath deposes and states as 
1. I am a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah and reside at the address of 
1407 Utah Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
3. On July 28,1997, my son, Armando Molina, was sentenced i 
Third Judicial District Court and Denny Kandt was present at the hearing and was 
1 
present with me and other people in Court. 
4. After Court, Amanda Garay, Amber Lloyd, Laura Vasquez and Denny Kandt 
and others talked with me outside the Third Judicial District Court courtroom for a 
considerable period of time after court finished at about 5:30 p.m.. I then observed 
Denny Kandt, Amanda Garay, Amber Lloyd and Anabell Martinez leave the Courtroom. 
We all met in front of the courthouse and we talked in front of the Court fifteen or twenty 
minutes. 
5. I talked to Denny Kandt and the girls he was with until about 6:00 p.m. on July 
28,1997, and then he appeared to have he left with the girls. 
6. When Denny was talking to me outside of the courthouse, Anthony Wallace 
was not present 
7. I was contacted by Denny's family prior to his trial, and I was contacted by an 
investigator. However, I was never contacted to testify at trial. 
8. I was willing to testify if called as a witness on behalf of Denny Kandt and I 
am still willing to testify to that effect. 
DATED this / j day of January, 1998. 
ROSIE AMARO 
2 
<dPfr«-*LMJ 
State Of Utah ) 
:ss 
County Of Salt Lake ) 
On the / / day of January, 1998, personally appeared before me, ROSIE 
AMARr ioiL-guing At'l'iil.ivil, svi'i'.ir. Ih,tl llu' i.inli.'nK llii.'r„"i| L\W ii 
according to the best of information and belief and has executed the same. 
/I 
T 
I 
" w M S S i m Notary Mile 
321 Soutfc 600 East I 
Salt Lake Ci^. Utah 84121 J 
My Commission Expires 1 
^H^-
FAX/MAILING CERTIFICATE 
7J7\ 
v day (-1, I „ 1111,1 < 11 v, I" -' »'"' S, a 11 u c an J correct copy 
of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT was faxed/mailed First Class, postage prepaid to: 
CYH. CASTLE 
DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY 
231 EAST 400 SOUTH, SUITE 300 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
DATED this _L-L day of January, 1998. 
